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Abstract: The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) passed 
through Congress on partisan lines and with only lukewarm public support. 
The Obama administration and Congressional Democrats, though, had reason 
to expect that the ACA’s political fortunes would substantially improve as 
the acrimonious debate over its enactment faded and millions of Americans 
came to receive significant benefits from health care reform. But 5 years after 
its passage, the ACA’s political foundations remain shaky. We suggest that one 
reason for the ACA’s unsettled fate is the role of policy feedbacks that under-
mine public support for and opponents’ acceptance of the program. The ACA 
experience highlights how policy feedbacks can vary widely in their political 
impact, and suggests that some policies are in fact self-undermining. We also 




The tortuous path to enactment of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) has been widely analyzed (Cohn 2010; Daschle and Nather 2010; 
Kirsch 2011; McDonough 2011; Starr 2011; Jacobs and Skocpol 2012; Brill 2015). 
Many ACA supporters anticipated that public support for the ACA would grow 
and partisan conflict would fade over time, with Obamacare gradually winning 
acceptance among its opponents – even if it was grudging and hostile acceptance 
in conservative quarters. Presidential advisor David Axelrod, for example, said 
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in 2010 that “As the American people become familiar with what this program 
is and what it isn’t, they’re going to be very, very happy with it” (Baker 2012). 
As public support for the ACA developed and more Americans obtained benefits 
through health care reform, Democrats could anticipate that efforts to overturn 
Obamacare would recede.
In part, this expectation reflected prior experiences with programs that were 
controversial prior to enactment, but subsequently became much more politi-
cally popular and institutionalized – Medicare being the paradigmatic case in 
health care (Oberlander 2003). But the turn in political support has not occurred 
for the ACA. Congressional Republicans continue to pursue plans to “repeal and 
replace” Obamacare through legislative and legal challenges, and many states 
governed by the GOP have fiercely resisted the ACA’s implementation. Five years 
after enactment, public support for the ACA has been both quite stable and 
underwhelming, with more Americans opposed to (47%) than favoring it (40%), 
as of March 2015, though many of its individual provisions are more popular than 
the overall Act (Brodie et al. 2010; HuffPost Pollster 2015). Partisan differentials in 
attitudes toward the ACA remain remarkably high, as reflected not just in whether 
the law is viewed favorably, but also (and less plausibly) in self-reported percep-
tions of whether the ACA has helped or hurt the survey respondent (Jacobs and 
Mettler 2011; RAND Corporation 2014; Kaiser Family Foundation 2015a). In short, 
even as millions of Americans gained insurance coverage and other benefits due 
to the ACA’s policies – the uninsured population declined by about 9–12 million 
persons during the first year the law’s major coverage provisions were imple-
mented (Blumenthal and Collins 2014; Long et al. 2014) – its political foundations 
remain shaky.
Anticipated feedback effects from the ACA played a strong role in the expec-
tation that both support from the public and lawmakers would grow following 
Obamacare’s enactment. Several ACA provisions that provided concentrated 
benefits to individuals were “front-loaded,” slated to start shortly after the law’s 
passage, while some provisions that were likely to be unpopular or controver-
sial were “back-loaded” to several years after the ACA’s major benefits started 
flowing. Moreover, tens of millions of Americans were expected to gain from the 
law’s expansion of access to health insurance coverage and new consumer pro-
tections. Given the scope of these benefits, and the experience of programs like 
Medicare that outgrew their controversial origins to attain mass popularity and 
robust political status, the Obama administration and Congressional Democrats 
could reasonably expect the ACA’s coalition to strengthen substantially over time. 
But to date that has not happened – and that is the fundamental political puzzle 
surrounding Obamacare.
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The political logic of entrenching the ACA politically is consistent with a major 
stream of political science literature on policy feedbacks emanating from the 
seminal work of Paul Pierson (Pierson 1993, 1994, 2000). In this “historical insti-
tutionalist” approach to policy feedbacks, policies become entrenched by offering 
concentrated benefits to constituencies while many costs are delayed, diffused, or 
obscured. Because voters develop a sense of entitlement to benefits once they start 
receiving them, and politicians try to avoid blame for imposing cutbacks (Weaver 
1986), benefits are unlikely to be rescinded once they start to flow because politi-
cians fear the electoral consequences of doing so. Opposition fades because politi-
cians, even those who oppose the program, make the political calculation that it is 
not worth alienating recipients of benefits or supportive publics.
The continued conflict and uncertainty over Obamacare’s fate suggest that 
an understanding of policy feedbacks as largely self-reinforcing is incomplete. In 
this article we sketch out a perspective on the political dynamics of policy feed-
backs that is more comprehensive in the range of policy feedbacks that it consid-
ers. We discuss fiscal and administrative as well as socio-political policy feedback 
effects, and we discuss variation in the direction of those feedback effects (self-
undermining, mixed, and self-reinforcing), in the timing of initial incidence of 
those effects (short-term, medium-term and long-term) and in their duration 
(temporary versus permanent). We also argue that the ACA’s political feedback 
effects are very different from that of entitlement programs like Social Security 
and Medicare in terms of the visibility and concentration of benefit flows as well 
as the fragmentation and political resources of beneficiaries. Understanding the 
broader range of feedback effects, we argue, helps to clarify why conflict over the 
ACA continues unabated and why its fate remains uncertain. A central argument 
is that, as the ACA experience illustrates, policies frequently produce feedback 
effects that undermine themselves as well as feedbacks that reinforce their base 
of political support. Many of these self-undermining feedbacks are initially unan-
ticipated or underestimated, as politicians focus on “making a deal” that can win 
enactment in the gridlock-prone US system and on mobilizing public support. 
Our analysis also makes clear how sensitive policy feedback effects are to the 
political and policy environments in which those policies are generated, inter-
preted, and modified.
We begin by outlining existing approaches to the analysis of policy feedback 
effects. Next, we briefly review the ACA’s enactment and outline its core provi-
sions. We then examine the ACA’s key provisions and the complex feedbacks 
that they generated. We conclude by discussing the implications of our analysis 
for understanding the role of policy feedbacks in public policy and for the ACA’s 
political trajectory.
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Understanding Policy Feedback Effects
The dominant view of policy feedback effects associated with the historical 
institutionalist approach emphasizes long-term, frequently slow-moving, self-
reinforcing effects on political support for programs. As constituencies grow up 
around programs and public support for those programs builds, the menu of 
alternatives considered is likely to shrink to incremental – and generally expan-
sionary – adjustments to existing benefits, unless there are exogenous shocks to 
the “policy regime” (the set of policies in a particular sector) that is in place.
A second major literature on policy feedbacks, associated with the work of 
Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (2002, 2009; Jones and Baumgartner 2005) 
and their collaborators, emphasizes the dynamics of punctuated equilibria. 
Because policymakers face more potential areas for action than they can handle, 
policy sectors are often dominated by “policy monopolies” of influence that 
derive benefits from the status quo. Such monopolies reinforce their control by 
developing “formal or informal rules of access [that] discourage the participation 
of “outsiders,” and…prevalent understandings of the policy [that] are so positive…
they evoke only support or indifference by those not involved” (Baumgartner and 
Jones 2009). Thus policymaking “is very static but reluctantly changes when 
signals are strong enough” (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, p. 19), usually as the 
result of exogenous shocks to existing equilibria such as focusing events, which 
cause increased attention to be devoted to that subsystem by outsiders who are 
less likely to be concentrated beneficiaries of the status quo. Proponents of the 
status quo are often able to re-assert their monopoly as the outsiders’ interest in 
the policy wanes.
Recent research on policy feedback effects attempts to integrate and extend 
these literatures. Eight broad conclusions emerge from this literature. First, poli-
cies are not always self-reinforcing (Campbell 2011; Patashnik and Zelizer 2013). 
Policy reforms can be eroded or reversed (Patashnik 2008), and policies may even 
have feedback effects that endogenously undermine those policies over time 
(Weaver 2010; Jacobs and Weaver forthcoming).
Second, policy feedback mechanisms and effects vary both in terms of type 
and intensity. In Table 1, we divide policy feedbacks associated into three broad 
categories: socio-political, fiscal, and administrative with distinctive causal 
mechanisms (Weaver 2010; Jacobs and Weaver forthcoming; for a similar catego-
rization, see Patashnik and Zelizer 2013). Socio-political policy feedback effects 
concern whether public and elite support for a policy regime is reinforced or 
undermined over time. These mechanisms and effects include feedbacks at the 
level of mass cognition (e.g., is the policy perceived to be successful or disastrous 
in achieving its objectives and does it lead predominantly to the mobilization of 
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supporters or opponents?). Whether the policy leads to a menu of reform options 
that is truncated to solely incremental changes or stimulates a search for more 
dramatic “regime-shifting” reforms (usually in response to a perception of serious 
and unavoidable policy failings) also influences the odds that a policy remains 
stable or is subject to revision.
Fiscal effects concern whether a program creates budgetary strains that are 
likely to raise concerns among powerful actors, notably Treasury or Finance 
Ministries, weakening the autonomy of groups dominating a policy subsystem. 
Administrative feedback effects encompass design and operational elements that 
allow the agencies in charge of implementing a policy to retain or acquire the 
capacity to implement the program in a manner that is perceived as successful 
by internal and external constituencies. This in turn will result in the strength-
ening or weakening of agency morale, external reputation, and external politi-
cal support. Self-undermining feedback effects of all three types (socio-political, 
fiscal, and administrative) are likely to involve developments in the program that 
disrupt relationships between policy “insiders” and “outsiders” in ways that 
increase attention from and involvement by outsiders because of perceptions 
by those groups of heightened political salience or costs, budgetary strains, or 
administrative failures.
Third, few policy feedback effects are “purely” endogenous. Feedback effects 
are more likely to be self-undermining rather than self-reinforcing under some 
conditions than others. Indeed, a fourth and related point is that feedback effects 
can change over time in their direction and intensity: feedback mechanisms that 
reinforce a program at one point in time may undermine it at another point in time 
as conditions change. Earmarked revenue sources illustrate both of these points. 
Earmarking revenue may insulate a program and foster incremental expansion 
when revenues are flush but spark retrenchment or even a more radical consid-
eration of policy alternatives when revenues run short. And whether revenues 
in trust funds are flush or lean in turn depends on conditions such as macro-
economic growth and demographic shifts that alter the ratio of contributors to 
beneficiaries. Similarly, public perceptions of costs and risks will be higher when 
political elites have incentives to highlight those costs or risks. Self-undermining 
administrative feedbacks will be more prevalent when policy mandates given to 
administering agencies are intrinsically complex and difficult.
Fifth, policy feedback effects are often mixed in direction rather than unidi-
rectional. Pre-2010 health policies in the US, for example, had a number of self-
reinforcing feedback effects, notably engendering a sense of entitlement among 
Medicare recipients and a fear among those with good employer-sponsored 
health insurance plans that reforms to expand coverage to the uninsured that 
simultaneously altered their insurance arrangements would make them worse 
44      Jonathan Oberlander and R. Kent Weaver
off. But Medicare policies also engendered concerns about gaps in its benefits 
and the reliance on employer-sponsored insurance produced anxiety among 
workers over the potential loss of coverage, particularly during times of economic 
downturn, and perennial concerns over affordability given rising premiums.
Sixth, policy feedback effects may be either fast or slow-moving. Major focus-
ing events can provoke an immediate policy response. Long-term trends may be 
more akin to the famous (albeit apocryphal) Al Gore anecdote about a frog being 
boiled in water that is heated slowly, such as the slow but seemingly inexorable 
rise in health care’s share of the US economy. Slow-moving policy feedbacks are 
less likely to provoke an intervention by constituencies external to a policy sub-
system, but they may also be less likely to experience waning attention by those 
interests in the latter stages of the issues attention cycle outlined by Anthony 
Downs (1972).
Seventh, self-undermining feedback effects are rarely a sufficient cause of 
policy change. While suffering concentrated costs may increase concern and an 
effort to find policy alternatives among affected groups, procedural rules that 
limit their participation and other factors can create barriers to acting on that 
disaffection. They may have to wait until sympathetic politicians gain power in 
order to redress their grievances, and in systems with multiple veto points like the 
US, even severe self-undermining policy feedbacks can result in the persistence 
of problems rather than in policy change.
Eighth and finally, when seeking to enact policy reforms, politicians and 
group leaders may seek to manipulate policy feedback mechanisms and effects 
to achieve policy and political objectives – for example by front-loading concen-
trated benefits and back-loading concentrated costs. However, they are likely to 
encounter a variety of constraints in their efforts to do so. Fiscal rules and con-
straints that require increased costs and benefits to be balanced within a particu-
lar time period, for example, can limit front-loading of concentrated benefits. The 
need to build political support coalitions for policy change, including actors who 
reject preferred options of coalition leaders, may require a political compromise 
that makes some strategies for manipulating feedback mechanisms untenable.
In sum, policy feedbacks are not always self-reinforcing, and such feedbacks 
can, under certain circumstances, actually undermine a program’s political 
support. These dynamics are visible in the political life of the Affordable Care Act.
The Politics of ACA Enactment
The history of health care reform in the US is largely one of failure (Starr 1982; 
Blumenthal and Morone 2009; Altman and Shactman 2011; Hoffman 2012). The 
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Obama administration and Congressional Democrats overcame long odds to 
win passage of the Affordable Care Act. The extraordinary politics of the ACA’s 
 enactment have been discussed extensively elsewhere (Cohn 2010; Daschle and 
Nather 2010; Oberlander 2010; Brown 2011; Hacker 2011; Kirsch 2011; McDonough 
2011; Starr 2011; Jacobs and Skocpol 2012; Brill 2015). Here we focus on the con-
straints and opportunities that reformers faced during 2009–2010, as well as on 
the assumptions, decisions, and compromises that shaped the ACA, its imple-
mentation, and the resulting socio-political, fiscal, and administrative policy 
feedbacks.
Reformers presumed that the only viable reform model was one that built on 
existing health insurance arrangements and left as many insured Americans as 
possible in their existing plans. The Obama administration and Congressional 
Democrats believed that the ill-fated Clinton health care plan of 1993–1994 had 
imploded largely because it was too disruptive to the existing system and alienated 
the well-insured (Oberlander 2010). In addition, they were strongly influenced by 
the example of Massachusetts, which in 2006 enacted an ambitious expansion 
of insurance coverage that leveraged both existing public insurance and private 
insurance plans – and that drew wide bipartisan support (McDonough 2011). The 
Massachusetts model combined policies and ideas associated with conservatives 
(an individual mandate, private plan competition, individual choice of plan) with 
policies and goals (Medicaid expansion, expanding access to affordable insur-
ance, regulation of private insurers) associated with liberals, a combination the 
ACA would emulate. The Massachusetts experience suggested that such a model 
could provide a political blueprint for passing health reform through Congress 
and produce a workable approach to expanding insurance coverage.
Another lesson taken from the Clinton health care misadventure was the 
necessity of winning over interest-group support. The Clinton administration had 
fought an unsuccessful multi-front war against health care stakeholders, includ-
ing the insurance industry and business interests, a battle the Obama adminis-
tration very much wanted to avoid (Oberlander 2010; Brown 2011). That in turn 
meant constructing a reform plan that accommodated important interests, for 
example by building on private insurance and making a deal with the pharmaceu-
tical industry to not pursue stronger cost controls in exchange for their support.
Democrats’ reform vision in 2009–2010, then, ruled out more sweeping 
models, such as single-payer, Canadian-style national health insurance. Instead, 
the aim was to find ways to fold the uninsured into the prevailing US health insur-
ance system, leaving its major pillars – Medicare, Medicaid, employer-sponsored 
private insurance – in place so as maximize the chances of securing both public 
and stakeholder support for reform. The ACA is ambitious in its scope and aspira-
tions, yet its approach to health reform is also incremental in key respects. The 
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ACA represents an effort to place an additional series of patches on the existing 
patchwork of US health care (Marmor and Oberlander 2011).
In covering the uninsured, reformers confronted a formidable fiscal chal-
lenge, namely how to pay for expanding insurance. The Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) would not credit much in the way of savings to politically appealing 
measures such as promoting prevention or paying on the basis of value rather 
than volume (in other words, changing the payment system for medical services 
to reward doctors and hospitals for better health outcomes and adherence to 
clinical guidelines, rather than reimbursing medical providers for each service 
provided regardless of its necessity or value). That left Democrats with an array of 
politically difficult and controversial options to pay for health care reform, from 
cutting Medicare payments to raising taxes on individuals. The Obama adminis-
tration decided that politically it could not afford to spend more than $1 trillion 
on health reform, which would have major implications for the type of coverage 
offered through the ACA (Oberlander 2014a). Further, the Democratic coalition in 
Congress contained a number of Blue Dogs, fiscal conservatives who insisted that 
any health reform plan not increase, and preferably decrease, the federal budget 
deficit. The administration promised to abide by PayGo principles, which meant 
they had to find about $1 trillion in revenues and spending offsets over a decade 
to pay for the ACA.
Finally, the ACA relied extensively on states to implement health reform (Starr 
2011). Many of the uninsured were to gain coverage through the state-admin-
istered Medicaid program. And states were given the opportunity to establish 
health insurance exchanges, purchasing pools where the uninsured and small 
business could go to obtain coverage (Jones, Bradley, and Oberlander 2014). Lib-
erals had pressed for a national exchange, but Democrats’ filibuster-proof major-
ity of 60 in the Senate, which included Ben Nelson of Nebraska and others hostile 
to an expansionary federal role, made such a scheme impossible to pass; a Medi-
care-like public insurance option for the uninsured failed to clear the Senate for 
similar reasons. When the House passed the Senate bill in 2010 after Scott Brown’s 
victory in a special Massachusetts election deprived Democrats of their filibuster-
proof Senate majority, and reconciliation was then used to pass a “sidecar” bill to 
revise the law, the Senate’s version of state-run exchanges remained intact. The 
federal government would instead serve as a backup, establishing exchanges in 
states whose governments declined to set up their own (McDonough 2011).
At the time of the ACA’s enactment, that arrangement did not seem crucial, 
since the vast majority of states were expected to embrace the chance to craft 
their own exchanges, nor did the reliance on Medicaid appear problematic 
since all states were expected to expand it given the alternative of losing all of 
their federal Medicaid funding. Subsequent events, though, would underscore 
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just how crucial the reliance on state implementation was (Jones, Bradley, and 
 Oberlander 2014).
The ACA’s Core Provisions
Given these assumptions, compromises, and constraints, what kind of health 
care reform did the US enact in 2010? The ACA contains a broad array of poli-
cies that aim to increase health insurance coverage, control health care spending, 
and transform how medical care services are delivered and paid for (McDonough 
2011; Kaiser Family Foundation 2013; Oberlander 2014a). Obamacare seeks to 
enhance access to insurance by providing income-related subsidies to low- and 
middle-income Americans to help them purchase insurance (subsidies are avail-
able for persons up to 400% of the federal poverty level). Additionally, the ACA 
establishes health insurance exchanges (also known as marketplaces) where the 
uninsured can use their subsidies and choose from private insurance plans that 
offer varying levels of coverage. Private insurers are regulated so they cannot 
deny coverage or charge higher premiums to persons with pre-existing condi-
tions. Annual and lifetime limits on benefits are prohibited. Minimum standards 
for insurance benefits are set and the ACA requires enhanced coverage of preven-
tive services. Young adults can stay on their parents’ insurance plans until age 
26. The law also requires most individuals to obtain and larger employers to offer 
health insurance coverage or pay penalties. Finally, the ACA called for expand-
ing Medicaid eligibility to all persons who earned  < 138% of the federal poverty 
level ($16,243 for an individual in 2015), regardless of their demographic category. 
Previously, in order to qualify for Medicaid enrollees had to be in a specific demo-
graphic category, such as pregnant women and children, and income thresholds 
for eligibility for adults varied widely across states.
These provisions were expected to have a major impact on health insur-
ance coverage. The Congressional Budget Office (2010) projected that the ACA 
would reduce the uninsured population by 30 million persons by 2016. The ACA 
funded this coverage expansion through a combination of new taxes and pro-
jected savings in federal health care expenditures (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2013). Americans making over $200,000 a year ($250,000 for couples) must pay 
higher Medicare payroll taxes, and their investment income is now subject to 
the Medicare payroll tax. Penalties paid by individuals who do not obtain insur-
ance and larger employers who do not offer coverage to their workers also are 
expected to contribute significantly to the ACA’s financing. The ACA additionally 
imposes taxes on the health care industry, including medical device manufactur-
ers, for-profit insurers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and tanning salons. A tax 
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on high-cost private health insurance plans – the so-called “Cadillac tax” – is 
scheduled to go into effect in 2018. New limits on flexible spending accounts and 
the tax deductibility of health care expenses are also established (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2013).
The ACA’s funding relies as well on substantial savings from reducing the 
projected rate of growth in federal health care spending (CBO 2010). The law 
restrains the growth rate in Medicare payments to hospitals and cuts payments 
to the private insurance plans (Medicare Advantage) that contract with Medicare. 
These policies, particularly the reduction in hospital payments, are expected to 
produce a significant slowdown in Medicare spending (indeed, there is evidence 
that these provisions are already generating savings). However, the ACA contained 
a back-up mechanism to restrain Medicare spending growth: the Independent 
Payment Advisory Board (IPAB). The IPAB was envisioned as a nonpartisan board 
comprised by health policy experts. If Medicare spending exceeded thresholds 
specified in the law, the IPAB would be empowered to make recommendations to 
reduce program expenditures and if Congress did not act, the IPAB’s recommen-
dations would then become law (Oberlander and Morrison 2013).
While the ACA reduces the growth in Medicare payments to medical provid-
ers, it also aims to control costs by changing how hospitals, doctors, and other 
providers are paid, and by changing how medical care services are delivered, 
thereby impacting health care spending across the entire health care system. The 
ACA encourages a variety of experiments in health care payment and delivery, 
including Accountable Care Organizations, medical homes, penalties on hos-
pitals for high readmission rates, payments to doctors and hospitals based on 
value (so-called pay for performance), and bundled payment (Oberlander 2011). 
Advocates of these strategies tout their potential to simultaneously control health 
care spending while improving the quality of medical care delivery and health 
outcomes. Additionally, within the ACA’s health insurance exchanges, reformers 
sought to control insurance costs by relying on a system of competition between 
health plans.
In sum, the ACA contains a wide array of policies that aim not simply to 
expand access to health insurance coverage, but also to control health care 
spending and improve the quality of medical care.
The ACA’s Feedback Effects
The sheer magnitude of the ACA ensured that it would produce numerous and 
varied feedback effects. For all the controversy that has surrounded the ACA, it 
contains no shortage of self-reinforcing feedbacks. The law’s architects sought 
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to build popular support by selectively frontloading politically appealing poli-
cies (although the bulk of the ACA’s major benefit and financing provisions came 
online simultaneously during 2013–2014). Provisions that were frontloaded in 
implementation – and began in 2010 after the law’s passage – included require-
ments to allow parents to keep their children on their insurance plans until age 
26 and prohibiting insurers from imposing pre-existing condition exclusions on 
children. Additionally, the ACA immediately enhanced Medicare coverage of 
prescription drugs and coverage of preventive services under both public and 
private plans. Other early policies (all implemented during 2010–2011) included 
the provision of health insurance tax credits to small businesses, a prohibition 
on lifetime caps on the dollar amount of coverage by private insurers, a require-
ment that insurers spend a specified portion of their premium dollars on medical 
services or provide rebates to consumers, and establishment of a new insurance 
program for Americans with pre-existing conditions who otherwise could not 
obtain insurance. States were also given the option of extending Medicaid cover-
age to childless adults ahead of the national expansion planned for 2014 (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2015b).
In addition to these frontloaded provisions, the ACA contains a number 
of policies that began during 2013–2014 that extended benefits to millions of 
 Americans, including federal subsidies for the uninsured to purchase cover-
age through state health insurance exchanges (later renamed marketplaces), 
expansion of Medicaid to low-income Americans, private insurance regulations 
that prohibited insurers from denying coverage or charging higher premiums 
to persons on the basis of their health status, and requirements that individual 
insurance plans cover maternity services, which heretofore many did not include 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2015b).
The ACA, then, has a number of provisions aimed at providing new benefits to 
the already insured, improving access to health insurance for the uninsured, and 
protecting consumers from insurance company abuses, all measures that could be 
expected to strengthen both popular and policymaker support for the ACA.
Yet the ACA also contains many policies that are unpopular and impose costs 
on concentrated groups. In addition, regulatory decisions made by the Obama 
administration and problems in program administration have generated addi-
tional self-undermining feedbacks. Health care reform, which seeks to reconfig-
ure a policy area that is thick with interest groups and beneficiaries of pre-existing 
programs and constitutes almost one-fifth of the American economy, is inher-
ently disruptive (Feder 2014). Reform requires changes, and a reform as large as 
the ACA requires changes and redistribution that are controversial and creates 
losers as well as winners. Some of the self-undermining policy feedbacks in the 
ACA are predictable. For example, the Cadillac Tax, which imposes a 40% tax on 
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high-cost private health plans, is fiercely opposed by labor unions and unlikely 
to be popular with well-insured Americans. Although it is expected to generate 
large revenues for the federal government, it was not scheduled to go into effect 
until 2018, a back-loading that reflects its political liabilities (Oberlander 2011). 
And while the Cadillac tax is expected initially to affect a small percentage of 
Americans, its formula ensures that over time many more insurance plans will 
be subject to the tax, meaning that as it becomes more important as a financing 
mechanism it will simultaneously become more problematic politically.
The individual mandate – a requirement that individuals obtain health 
coverage or pay a penalty – is another policy that predictably could produce 
self-undermining effects. It imposes a direct financial loss on some Ameri-
cans, although the actual percentage of the population subject to the penalty 
is modest: the Congressional Budget Office (2014) estimates that 4 million 
people will be subject to the penalty in 2016, with total federal revenues from 
the penalty averaging about $5  billion per year during 2017–2022 (CBO 2014). 
The individual mandate makes health reform look punitive, and it has consist-
ently proven unpopular with the public, despite its importance to ensuring that 
health insurance exchanges for the uninsured are stable and do not attract dis-
proportionately sick, expensive populations. That the individual mandate is one 
of the policies most identified with the ACA has been a major political problem 
for the Obama administration. Reformers attempted to mute the negative politi-
cal impact of the policy by phasing it in, with a modest monetary penalty for not 
obtaining insurance in 2014 that accelerates in subsequent years (Mach 2014). 
The Obama administration also has carved out numerous exceptions to the indi-
vidual mandate that reduce the number of Americans who must pay the penalty: 
about 24 million of the 30 million Americans expected to be uninsured in 2016 
are expected to be exempt from penalties (CBO 2014). Still, as the individual 
mandate penalty climbs in future years and it becomes a more potent motivator 
for healthier Americans to join the insurance exchanges, it is likely to become 
more controversial as a larger number of Americans pay the fine for not having 
insurance.
Like the individual mandate, the requirement that larger employers offer 
coverage to their workers or pay a penalty is an ACA provision with predictably 
negative political effects. The employer mandate imposes (in the midst of a recov-
ering economy) direct losses on some businesses, especially medium-sized firms, 
who did not previously offer insurance and it establishes new coverage standards 
that even some firms that had offered coverage do not meet. And it has unan-
ticipated loopholes – that the Obama administration is trying to close – enabling 
large employers to satisfy the law’s requirements by offering their workers “bare 
bones” or “skinny” policies that have very limited benefits (Hancock 2013, 2014).
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Business lobbying groups have strongly opposed the requirement to offer 
insurance, and critics argue it will lead to more part-time workers, though there 
is little evidence to date of that shift (Garrett and Kaestner 2014). Although the 
employer mandate remains popular with the public, its popularity is very sus-
ceptible to framing effects – support increases significantly if respondents are 
prompted with the information that most large employers already provide insur-
ance and would not face a fine, and declines substantially when they are told that 
some employers might reduce employees from full to part time in order to avoid 
the fine (Kaiser Family Foundation 2014, p. 13).
Furthermore, the complicated nature both of the requirement and formula 
for calculating employer penalties – firms with 50 or more workers are liable 
only if one of their workers qualifies for a subsidy on the health insurance 
exchanges – as well as the reporting requirements on employers have made it 
difficult to implement. As a consequence of these fraught politics and technical 
issues, the Obama administration has twice delayed the onset of the employer 
mandate via executive orders (it is currently slated to start in 2015). Some health 
reform advocates, citing the complex rules and anticipated modest effect on 
employee coverage, are now calling for jettisoning the ACA’s employer mandate 
altogether; doing so, however, would have a negative impact on the federal 
budget deficit, variously estimated at between $46 and $130 billion between 
2014 and 2015 (Blumberg, Holahan, and Buettgens 2014; Cunningham and 
Cheney 2014).
Another ACA reform that has had difficulty getting off the ground is the 
Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB). Obama administration officials 
regarded the IPAB’s enactment as an important step toward controlling Medicare 
spending and giving experts, rather than politicians, influence to set the direc-
tion of program policy. But 5 years after the ACA’s enactment, IPAB exists only on 
paper; not a single member has been appointed to the board, indeed President 
Obama had not even nominated anyone to the board for Congressional approval. 
The Obama administration failed to anticipate the intense Republican opposition 
to IPAB, which has derailed its implementation. Instead of becoming an insti-
tutional buffer against rising health care costs, IPAB has become a non-factor 
in Medicare policy and a political liability. Opponents have portrayed IPAB as a 
“rationing board” that would deny services to Medicare enrollees and the embod-
iment of a real-life “death panel.” Such allegations are, of course, absolutely 
false, yet IPAB’s failed launch does reveal the Obama administration’s oblivious-
ness both to the partisan politics surrounding Medicare in an era of historic levels 
of polarization and to the political vulnerabilities of a plan to empower non-
elected experts to make key decisions on Medicare policy would bind  Congress 
 (Oberlander and Morrison 2013).
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Other ACA Medicare provisions have also proven highly controversial. Aware 
of the political sensitivity of Medicare for its beneficiaries, the ACA contained a 
number of specific policies that were designed to appeal to seniors, including free 
annual wellness visits, expanded coverage of screening services (e.g., colonosco-
pies and mammograms) and a shrinking of the Medicare Part D “doughnut hole” 
in prescription drug coverage. As with many other coverage provisions, these 
expanded Medicare benefits were front-loaded in their timing.
Rather than securing senior support for the ACA, however, public debate has 
been more focused on the ACA’s reliance on Medicare reimbursement changes as 
a central mechanism – estimated at approximately half a trillion dollars in the 
2010–2019 period – to finance its expansion of insurance coverage to the unin-
sured. Such provisions, including slowing down the rate of increase in Medi-
care payments to hospitals, were necessary to get “CBO-scoreable” savings that 
would allow the ACA to be presented as paying for itself and actually reducing 
the federal deficit over the ensuing two decades (CBO 2010; Oberlander 2011). 
However, relying on Medicare savings to help fund the law played into the hands 
of ACA opponents who claimed that Obamacare was being financed on the backs 
of seniors and demanded that government “keep its hands off my Medicare.” The 
use of Medicare savings as a central funding mechanism for the ACA allowed 
opponents to scare seniors who feared that that Medicare cuts that would harm 
them were being used to provide benefits to others. Even if such fears were not jus-
tified – in fact, the ACA expanded Medicare benefits and slowing down the growth 
in Medicare spending helps program enrollees by making co-payments and other 
program costs more affordable – they were nonetheless politically potent.
As noted earlier, the ACA relies on myriad tax increases to fund part of its 
expansion of insurance coverage. Some of these increases, such as the Medicare 
payroll surtax for higher-income Americans, are already in effect and have yet to 
generate much controversy. However, the tax on medical device manufacturers 
has caught the industry’s attention, and it has lobbied aggressively for repeal-
ing the tax. Indeed, there is bipartisan support for overturning the device tax in 
response to complaints from the medical device industry, a classic illustration 
of the politics of concentrated interests (Millman 2014). That the tax is actually 
only marginally important to the ACA’s funding – an estimated net revenue of $29 
billion over 10 years (Gravelle and Lowry 2014) – probably increases its likelihood 
of repeal, since it can be removed without jeopardizing the law’s major benefit 
provisions (Oberlander 2014b).
During the ACA’s implementation the limits of its insurance coverage also has 
emerged as an issue. Many plans offered through the health insurance exchanges 
have limited provider networks where only select hospitals and doctors are 
included, and carry high deductibles and cost-sharing. The cost-sharing amounts 
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in these ACA plans are much higher than in the average employer-sponsored 
plan, though lower-income persons can obtain subsidies from the federal gov-
ernment to defray the costs. The limits of ACA coverage have become a politi-
cal issue for the administration, as critics have charged Obamacare with offering 
inadequate coverage (ironically, conservative critics heretofore supported high-
deductible plans). To be sure, there are real policy tradeoffs: limited networks 
allow plans to offer less expensive premiums. But the source of the limited cover-
age is the fiscal constraints faced and compromises made by the Obama adminis-
tration and Congressional Democrats to pass the ACA (Oberlander 2014). A health 
reform plan with more money dedicated to its financing would have allowed for 
more generous plans, and perhaps such plans would generate a stronger political 
constituency of beneficiaries.
The aforementioned self-undermining policy feedbacks were all arguably pre-
dictable. But the ACA has also encountered unexpected problems that were not 
apparent at the time of the law’s enactment. The disastrous rollout of healthcare.gov 
in the fall of 2013, beset by technical glitches that prevented people from enrolling 
in coverage, handed ACA opponents evidence that seemed to confirm their predic-
tions of the program’s unworkability, further eroded public confidence in the federal 
government’s administrative abilities, and initially reduced enrollment in the new 
health insurance exchanges run by the federal government dramatically (because of 
unexpected state opposition to establishing health insurance exchanges, Washing-
ton was responsible for their operation in about three dozen states, amplifying the 
scope of the fiasco). The administration eventually repaired the major glitches and 
by the end of the 2014 enrollment period, enrollment had actually met projections. 
Yet the political damage to the ACA had already been done.
Another unanticipated negative feedback arose when private insurers started 
cancelling private policies on the individual insurance market in the fall of 2013. 
Prior to the ACA’s enactment, about 5% of Americans obtained health coverage 
directly on what is known as the individual or non-group insurance market. That 
market had a poor reputation among most health reformers: it was administra-
tively expensive with high marketing costs, persons with preexisting medical 
problems often were charged exorbitant premiums through medical underwrit-
ing or denied coverage altogether, and individual insurance policies had a high 
turnover rate. Problems with the individual market provided the impetus for 
establishing new health insurance exchanges where the uninsured could pool 
their purchasing power, insurers would be strictly regulated, and marketing costs 
would be lowered (McDonough 2011).
The fate of the individual market did not receive substantial attention during 
the 2009–2010 health reform debate, probably because a relatively small pro-
portion of the country has such plans. Health policy analysts presumed that 
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this market would largely be displaced by the new health insurance exchanges, 
where enrollees would have access to subsidized coverage. However, there were 
some individuals on the individual market who were getting a good deal on their 
coverage and wanted to keep it, a reality the Obama administration discovered 
when insurers cancelled their policies in the fall of 2013. President Obama had 
promised that “if you like your plan, you can keep it,” a promise broken by the 
cancellations. The ensuing political furor, amplified by ACA opponents, contrib-
uted to the notion that the ACA was hurting insured Americans, and forced the 
administration to backtrack and permit states to allow such individual policies 
to continue. Disruption of the individual market was inevitable – and in many 
cases, such disruption benefited those persons with access to subsidized cover-
age on the exchanges (Feder 2014). But the administration could have mitigated 
the fallout associated with this issue by writing looser standards to “grandfather” 
in enrollees in the individual market.
Finally, arguably the most important unanticipated policy feedback associ-
ated with the ACA is its vulnerability to legal challenges. The administration and 
other reformers did not believe that the individual mandate would face serious 
constitutional jeopardy, yet the Supreme Court came within one vote (saved only 
by Chief Justice John Roberts joining the court’s four liberals in a highly unusual 
coalition) in 2012 of invalidating the individual mandate – and the entire law. Nor 
did the administration, or any other reformers, foresee a ruling by the Court that 
effectively made Medicaid expansion optional for the states. That ruling opened a 
new front in the battle over Obamacare, and even with the lure of federal financ-
ing, to date 22 states have rejected Medicaid expansion. Consequently, the ACA’s 
effort to cover low-income Americans has suffered a serious blow since uninsured 
persons living below the federal poverty level in states that do not expand Med-
icaid have no access to affordable coverage. Moreover, the Supreme Court will 
rule in the summer of 2015 on a case – King v. Burwell – challenging the legality 
of providing subsidies to the uninsured in states where the federal government 
operates exchanges. A ruling that declares those subsidies illegal would deal a 
major blow to Obamacare in about three-dozen states (Oberlander 2014b). The 
unanticipated legal challenges to the ACA have threatened (and in the case of 
Medicaid expansion, undercut) its core provisions to expand coverage, kept the 
health reform debate going, and contributed to undermining the law’s legitimacy.
Conclusions
Examining the enactment and subsequent implementation of the Affordable 
Care Act provides important insights not only into its own difficult history but 
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also into the complex dynamics of policy feedbacks in general, and how they 
can vary even within a single policy sector. Five years after the 1965 enactment 
of Medicare, few politicians could imagine the repeal of that program, and fewer 
still would advocate it. Five years after enactment of the Medicare Catastrophic 
Coverage Act of 1988, it was only a painful memory for those who enacted it. 
Five years after passage of the Affordable Care Act, its fate is still very much up 
in the air.
These differing fates reflect, in part, these programs’ different policy feed-
backs. Medicare provided enormous immediate benefits to the elderly for a 
modest price, and followed the established and popular social insurance arrange-
ments of Social Security, including payroll tax financing. The Medicare Cata-
strophic Coverage Act also sought to extend benefits to seniors, but it departed 
from traditional social insurance and Medicare arrangements by having seniors 
self-finance the benefits (rather than relying on contributions from the working 
public) and imposing high, visible, and immediate costs on more affluent Medi-
care enrollees while delaying benefits. As a consequence, it triggered intense 
opposition: even Medicare beneficiaries who would have benefited from the law 
were confused by its financing mechanism, and the program quickly imploded 
politically ( Himelfarb 1995; Oberlander 2003; Patashnik 2008).
The Affordable Care Act lies in between these two extremes. In contrast to 
Medicare, the ACA is not a social insurance program with a clearly identified 
constituency that has a clear connection to benefits (Marmor and Oberlander 
2011). The ACA treats different groups of Americans in different ways at different 
times, and that fragmented structure makes it harder to build support for the law, 
harder to recognize benefits that do exist, and easier to attack, since the law’s 
constituency is diffuse and many intended beneficiaries, including many of the 
uninsured, do not understand the benefits available to them.
Within this fragmented programmatic structure, the Obama administration 
and its allies did seek to manipulate the ACA’s feedback effects in ways that would 
benefit their political and policy interests, notably in frontloading some concen-
trated benefits and back-loading some important concentrated costs. However, 
they were highly constrained in how much they could do so by super-majority 
requirements to enact controversial legislation in the Senate, as well as by fiscal 
rules and Congressional Democrats’ internal divisions on substance and strat-
egy. The complex history and many compromises needed to win congressional 
passage of the ACA embedded many self-undermining feedbacks – socio-politi-
cal, financial, and administrative – and left it vulnerable to even more negative 
feedbacks encouraged by forces hostile to the ACA who could both challenge its 
legality and affect the way it was implemented. Reformers and the Obama admin-
istration, then, underestimated the impact of self-undermining policy feedbacks 
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and overestimated the extent to which the ACA would be politically institutional-
ized quickly and transform its political fortunes as Medicare did. Why did this 
occur?
The degree to which these policy feedbacks, and the ensuing conflict, were 
inevitable or reflect poor strategic choices by the Obama administration and its 
political allies is certainly debatable. Blaming poor strategy suggests that if the 
Obama administration and its allies had been more prescient and more politically 
savvy, they could have avoided many of the problems that the ACA subsequently 
encountered. This explanation requires that the administration (1) failed to see 
warning signs of trouble ahead that could have reasonably been anticipated, and 
(2) failed to take actions in light of those warning signs that would have made a 
difference.
Certainly, if Democrats had noticed the problematic wording in the ACA’s 
text related to the availability of subsidies in federally sponsored exchanges, 
they could have taken steps to revise the legislative language in ways that would 
have never allowed a legal challenge like King v. Burwell to emerge. The cancella-
tion of individual insurance policies during the fall of 2013 is one key area where 
the Obama administration appears to have overlooked the potential fallout of 
their own actions and the loss-imposing nature of some ACA provisions. Addi-
tionally, the ACA’s individual and employer mandates were highly controversial 
even before they went into effect. Indeed the political dynamic of the individual 
mandate strongly underlines how resourceful messengers can build strong oppo-
sition to a policy even before it has gone into effect. In a political environment 
that is both highly polarized and lacking slack resources to provide new benefits 
to attract voters, negative messaging becomes the major coin of political dis-
course in both politics and policymaking (Weaver 1986; Lee forthcoming). These 
negative messages can undermine the capacity of new policy to become popular 
and politically institutionalized, leaving program more vulnerable to challenges.
ACA proponents also underestimated the ability of critics to frame critiques 
(some more honest than others) about negative effects. ACA opponents in the 
Republican Party and their media allies repeated and amplified concerns from 
the real (cancellation of individually purchased policies, the troubled launch 
of healthcare.gov) to the mythical (death panels, cuts in Medicare benefits) and 
wove them into a broader narrative of Obama administration duplicity and wide-
spread loss imposition (Eckles and Schaffner 2010).
The Obama administration, Congressional Democrats, and health reform 
advocates appear to have badly miscalculated the political environment. Partisan 
polarization explains much of the ACA’s enduring political problems, as partisans 
framed debate around ACA’s negative impacts, real and imagined, emphasized 
loss-imposing policy consequences rather than the law’s beneficial impacts, and 
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resisted the ACA’s implementation at the state and federal level. Because of com-
promises made in the Senate and the 2012 Supreme Court ruling, states play a 
crucial role in health reform implementation – a role far greater than the ACA’s 
architects anticipated. ACA proponents underestimated state resistance to both 
exchanges, which had been an idea previously supported by many Republicans, 
and Medicaid expansion. After the 2010 elections and rise of the Tea Party, state 
politics moved to the right and GOP governors had a stronger incentive to boycott 
Obamacare and Medicaid expansion (Jones, Bradley, and Oberlander 2014). They 
have done so, despite, in the case of Medicaid, financial lures from the federal 
government: ideology and partisanship has trumped fiscal pragmatism in many 
states. Federalism clearly provided an opportunity for opponents to undermine 
the law’s implementation and operation, and to emphasize and indeed create 
both real and apparent loss-imposition.
It is less clear, however, what ACA proponents could have done to avoid the 
law’s federalism-related problems. While strategic mistakes certainly added to 
the self-undermining feedbacks of the ACA and added to its political and legal 
problems, most of its problems either seem difficult to anticipate or are due to 
constraints imposed by the political environment and the legacy of past policies 
that gave the ACA’s proponents limited room to maneuver. The rise of the Tea 
Party and its effect on forcing Republican officeholders into ever more intransi-
gent stances on implementation of and legal challenges to the ACA could hardly 
have been anticipated in 2009.
Even if ACA proponents had anticipated these problems, it is unlikely that 
they could have done much about them that would have fundamentally altered 
outcomes. Perhaps their most significant failure was not realizing that the ACA 
really would inevitably impose costs (e.g., cancelled insurance policies) as well as 
benefits in the short term. As noted earlier, politicians tend to minimize negative 
feedbacks at the time of a program’s enactment because they are focused on getting 
legislation through the Congressional gauntlet and on mobilizing public support. 
The ACA’s architects faced extraordinary obstacles to enacting health reform, 
which created strong incentives for them to minimize the law’s self-undermining 
feedbacks. But if Democratic lawmakers had perfect political foresight – given the 
large number who subsequently lost their seats – it is likely that some never would 
have voted for the ACA in the first place and it would not have passed Congress.
As noted at the outset of this article, public opinion on the ACA has been 
remarkably stable over last 5 years: despite initial problems with the rollout of 
the health insurance exchanges during 2013–2014 and subsequent successes in 
enrollment, public support for the ACA is quite similar to that in 2010 and con-
sistently more negative than positive. Even if healthcare.gov’s opening had been 
smooth and nobody had individual policies cancelled, it is not clear that the 
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ACA be much more popular and under significantly less attack: healthcare.gov 
is working well now, millions of Americans have gained insurance coverage, and 
yet the ACA still draws tepid public support and remains in a precarious political 
position. The importance of partisan polarization (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 
2006) in producing this prolonged uncertainly and conflict surrounding the ACA 
is impossible to overstate. Polarization has served as a crucial mediating factor in 
the politics of Obamacare, amplifying self-undermining feedbacks while obscur-
ing self-reinforcing policies and benefits.
In sum, we have emphasized that (1) policies may generate self-reinforcing 
and self-undermining feedback effects simultaneously, (2) the balance of these 
feedback effects may shift over time; (3) it is the balance of these effects that 
matters politically, with blame-avoiding and blame-generating politicians paying 
particular attention to policy consequences that appear to generate losses for par-
ticular groups; (4) feedback effects, especially socio-political feedbacks, are in 
part social constructs that reflect the framing that key shapers of opinion convey 
to the public about the impact of those policies, and they are mediated by exter-
nal factors like the level of partisan polarization; and (5) while self-undermining 
policy feedbacks may shape the political debate over revising a policy, the final 
outcome depends heavily on the political bargaining leverage of key actors and 
the institutional rules involved in changing policy. This case study of the Afford-
able Care Act suggests a number of extensions of this argument. For example, not 
all self-undermining effects are equivalent: some, like the costs imposed by the 
individual mandate, risk undermining an entire reform package of which they 
are one component. Others, like the Cadillac tax, mostly undermine themselves 
without jeopardizing the whole law.
The Democrats’ initial calculation in passing the Affordable Care Act was 
that if they could get a policy of “near” universal coverage in place, offer benefits 
to both large numbers of uninsured and insured Americans, pay off the states, 
neutralize key interest groups, and backload at least some of the concentrated 
costs, the policy would be impossible to get rid of. Rather than being a slam dunk, 
however, the ACA’s avoiding repeal or major rollback for the past 5  years has 
depended on maintaining veto power in the presidency and (through the super-
majority required for cloture) the Senate.
Republicans continue to push for Obamacare’s repeal. But Republicans 
have their own political problems: a pre-ACA status quo ante with many highly 
visible defects, and no credible alternative that would not make many individu-
als worse off (Pear 2015). If the Supreme Court upholds the government’s posi-
tion in King v. Burwell, the GOP will confront a political reality where millions of 
Americans, and the insurance and hospital industries, are benefiting from subsi-
dized insurance coverage and Medicaid expansion. The longer the ACA goes on, 
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the more beneficiaries it gains, and the more the medical care industry comes 
to depend on it for revenue, the harder it will be for Republicans to dislodge 
 Obamacare, even if the GOP wins the White House in 2016 (Oberlander 2014b). 
Still, the past 5 years have shown just how difficult it is to institutionalize a major 
new social program with complicated and mixed policy feedbacks in a polarized 
partisan environment. The fight over Obamacare is not over.
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